Domestic Politics
By the time the next general elections take place in 1987, followed by the 1988 indirect presidential election, the generational transfer will be nearly accomplished. One of the major thrusts of President Suharto's current term, now at midpoint, has been to entrench the formal structures of a Pancasila society. In a country that is statistically 90% Muslim, the Pancasila state is essentially secular, being based on the "Five Principles" of the Indonesian state. Ideological or particularistic dissent and division over the ends and means of politics is to be contained in the interests of development, and political competition is to give way to social harmony. This is to be accomplished statutorily through the passage of a package of five bills designed to set the "New Order" in constitutional concrete.
In February 1985, the political parties bill was passed requiring that all political parties espouse only the state ideology as their principle. Resisted most strongly by Muslim politicians grouped under the umbrella United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the new law effectively secularizes party competition through stipulating that parties can differ only in their programs, not in their principles. The regime continues to deny that the adoption of Pancasila as the sole principle for political parties means that the country is moving toward a single-party system. Certainly the impact is such that the PPP and Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), the other nongovernmental faction, are no longer vehicles for opposition in a competitive party system, but are to serve, as in a singleparty system, and despite their residual identities, as mobilizers of support for government policy. The largest of the PPP's constituent parties, the Nahadatul Ulama (NU), has withdrawn from active politics and announced that it will be "neutral" in the next elections in so far as the voting preferences of its individual members are concerned.
Already Golkar, the government's non-party party and chief mobilizer of electoral support, is gearing up for the 1987 legislative elections. It currently holds 246 of the 364 elective seats in the Peoples Representative Assembly (DPR). The next parliament will have 500 seats: 400 elected and 100 reserved for the military. Golkar aims to win at least 280 of the contested seats to maintain its relative position. This means taking about 67.7% of an estimated 90.68 million votes, or to use Golkar's precise figures (two years in advance), 61,391,869 votes. While the PPP and PDI have fallen into internal disarray and internecine squabbling, Golkar has pushed forward with its ambitious program of organization down to the village level. At the end of Golkar's October party congress, party chairman Lt. Gen. Sudharmono reported that membership numbered 10 million, of whom 6.5 million had been given cadre training. The growth and penetration of Golkar raises the interesting question as to whether it could provide an alternative or rival to the army as a constituent base for future aspiring presidential candidates.
It was not until June that the controversial Bill on Mass Organizations was passed. The other four bills were drawn to keep party politics confined within the Pancasila. The Bill on Mass Organizations extended the Pancasila system to all associational aspects of Indonesian society. All private voluntary social groupings must adopt the Pancasila as their sole guiding principle. If any group is deemed to have deviated from the Pancasila, the government has broad powers of intervention and dissolution. Muslim opponents of the law saw in it the imposition of a civil religion over Islamic organizations.
It was Islamic opposition to the Bill on Mass Organizations that had earlier sparked violent opposition such as the September 1984 Tanjung Priok riot. This spilled over into 1985. The country and world were shocked in January by bombings of Buddhist images at the Borobudur, linked to the commencement of the trials of those arrested in connection with the Tanjung Priok riots. Only a week after the Borobudur outrage, another national monument, the palace (kraton) of the Susuhunan of Solo, was leveled by fire. Sporadic bombings and incendiary attacks occurred throughout Indonesia creating a general sense of unease. In early July a fire destroyed the Metro shopping center in Jakarta's Chinatown. Two weeks later a major blaze gutted the headquarters of Radio Republik Indonesia. Twenty days after that 60 buildings in a Jakarta commercial district were engulfed in flames. The government actively discouraged speculation that these fires could have been politically motivated.
Suharto was resolute, vowing that the government would never bow to terrorism and violence. Its reaction to both the verbal and physical assault on the Pancasila society has been a crackdown on dissidents of whatever persuasion. Three series of trials in particular demonstrated the government's firm intention both to punish and to warn off "subversive" opposition. In the wake of the Tanjung Priok riots some 30 defendants were jailed for one to three years. Ten people were tried for the Bank Central Asia bombings, which were in retaliation for the Tanjung Priok killings and which had anti-Chinese overtones. Tasrif Tuasikal, an Islamic teacher and alleged "mastermind" of the plot, was given a life sentence. 
The Economy
The year 1985 was another year that saw the macroeconomic management of the economy continue to moderate the impact of lower oil prices. Oil and gas still account for 70% of Indonesia's export earnings. GDP growth in 1984 was 6.5% with inflation kept under 4%. The 1984/85 current account deficit was halved to under $2 billion. At the end of April, foreign exchange reserves totaled $10.5 billion as compared with the $6.3 billion on hand when the rupiah was devalued in March 1983. In June 1985, the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia approved new soft credits and grants of $2.4 billion for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1986, the same level as the previous year. According to the World Bank, Indonesia has been "very prudent" in its overall management of its international debt which at the end of 1984 was estimated at $24.6 billion. The debate on industrialization strategy in Indonesia continued in 1985, fueled by the World Bank's call for "an early rationalization of industrial and trade policy" by eliminating "implicit subsidies" to inefficient and high-cost domestic industries. These industries are often, however, the best-connected politically.
Too much of a good thing continues to flood Bulog, the National Logistics Bureau, with a huge surplus of rice. Only five years ago Indonesia was still a rice deficit country, but it now has had three bumper years in a row. Indonesia's higher-profile foreign policy and its meanderings from the ASEAN straight and narrow on Cambodia have caused questions to be raised as to the depth of Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN. Has Indonesia "outgrown" ASEAN as it seeks a leadership role consonant with its relative power and new-found political confidence? In Michael Leifer's words: "There is a growing willingness in Jakarta to think aloud about the unthinkable because ASEAN is seen to be holding Indonesia back."1 But because some elements of the Jakarta foreign policy elite are worriedly frustrated over Cambodia does not mean that they would lightly abandon the structure of regional cooperation that has served them so well in so many ways. The real problem is the degree to which ASEAN will be perceived in Jakarta as being strategically penetrated by extra-regional interest in competition with the working out of Indonesian national interest in the ASEAN setting.
